The five nuclear-weapon states of the nuclear non-proliferation reactor (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) are not required to enter into IAEA protection agreements under the non-proliferation regime. However, all five have signed voluntary offer guarantee agreements that allow the IAEA to apply protections for the equipment in selected eligible entities. This is the case with nuclear materials and civilian sites. The five nuclear-weapon States also signed additional protocols to the voluntary supply guarantee agreements. In his speech in Prague on 5 April, President Barack Obama said that one of the necessary improvements to the NPT regime was “to ensure immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules”. Non-compliance is also becoming more important in discussions about different fuel supply systems. A state would not be eligible for the security of the fuel supply if it were determined that it did not meet the protection obligations. The second activity, which is required under comprehensive safeguard agreements, is the inspection of the facilities. The purpose of an inspection is to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted and that facilities are not misused to manufacture undeclared nuclear materials. The additional protocol is for states that have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States that have CSAs that decide to enter into additional protocols must accept all provisions of the additional model protocol approved by the Governing Council in 1997.

States that have ad hoc or discretionary offer agreements can adopt and implement the measures of the additional protocol model that they are prepared to accept. The history of the IAEA`s protection measures begins at the forefront of the nuclear regime, which has focused on the debate on the elimination of the remaining fissile material. Dwight Eisenhowers` 1953 peace speech was the first step towards regulating nuclear activity to ensure that only peaceful ends stimulate scientific development. It proposed that states with remaining fissile material should contribute to an international fuel bank. The IAEA was proposed in 1954 to control the distribution and disposal of used nuclear materials. [3] Negotiations on safeguard measures were challenged as they would hinder the promotion of nuclear energy. [4] However, security measures help to strengthen the line between the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the creation of military equipment that could be used for militant purposes. Although security measures are only part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, they strengthen inspection and review and provide certainty that proliferation does not occur in states that have been declared nuclear-weapon-free and in non-nuclear-weapon States.

[5] The initial protocol on small quantities was made available to States with minimum or no nuclear materials and no nuclear materials in a “facility”. The initial small quantity protocol suspends the application of many provisions of the Generalized Guarantee Agreement (Part II).