In Greenbrier Obstetrics – Gynecology, P.C., Leao, a physician, entered into an employment contract with Greenbrier. The agreement provided that “this contract may be terminated in writing by EMPLOYEE or EMPLOY without further commitment after sixty (60) days in advance.” The employment contract also included an agreement not to compete, which stated “for a period of two (2) years after the termination of employment… EMPLOYEE must not, directly or indirectly, possess, manage, participate, be or maintain an interest in this practice within 20 (20) miles of the current EMPLOI office. Leao ended his employment with 60 days` notice. Leo then ruled that the competition agreement was null and for all. The Virginia Supreme Court found that there was a blurring between the provisions of the agreement because of the language “no other commitment” and then the obligation not to compete. The Tribunal interpreted the ambiguity in favour of the worker and found that Leao`s 60-day notice was closed with the entire agreement, including the non-competition clause. In Fame, a certified allergist and immunologist entered into an employment contract with an employer. The agreement contained a non-competitive provision that the physician, after being dismissed, would not be able to compete with the employer for two years in a given geographic area. If the physician is employed by a competitor to treat allergies or immunological disorders, the physician is prohibited from contacting the competitor in any way that performs work similar to that of the employer. After terminating the doctor, the employer requested that he not be bound by the non-compete clause. The District Court found that the provision was unenforceable.

The provision was able to take on more than one meaning: that the physician was prohibited from treating patients in the listed areas, regardless of where his office is located, or that the physician is not in the care of patients while he is physically in the listed areas. The Tribunal found that the reasonable interpretation of the provision was excessively cumbersome and therefore unenforceable, given that the physician had to check each patient to determine whether he or she was connected to the areas listed.